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Abstract 
 
Compulsory motor insurance schemes have gained prominence over the years as a policy prescription 
by governments in their quest to provide a safety net for the protection of consumers and insurers 
alike. By making as minimum, motor third party insurance compulsory, central government ensures 
that the burden of providing indemnity is removed from the fiscus and entrusted upon the insurance 
sector. This also proves to be mutually beneficial to the insurance companies as the risk pool is 
widened. Sadly South Africa does not have a fully-fledged motor third party compensation scheme but 
has a variant of such a scheme in the form of the Road Accident Fund. The limitations of this fund are 
that it only caters for motor third party liability for bodily injury or death and its limits of 
compensation are relatively low. In this article we demonstrate the need for policy makers in South 
Africa to reintroduce compulsory motor third party insurance in order to alleviate the burden of 
funding motor liability from the fiscus as well as to widen the risk pool of insurers. 
 
Keywords: Compulsory, Motor insurance, Third Party, Liability, South Africa 
 
 
* University of South Africa, Department of Finance ,Risk Management and Banking, P.O Box 392, UNISA, Pretoria 0003 
Fax: +27 (0) 86-642-6519 
Tel: +27(0) 12 -429 4680, +27(0) 76-289-8824 
E-mail: Ezingwe@unisa.ac.za 
** University of South Africa, Department of Finance ,Risk Management and Banking, P.O Box 392, UNISA, Pretoria 0003 
Fax: +27 (0) 86-569-8848 
Tel: +27(0) 12 -429 3757, +27(0) 78-410-0508 
E-mail: sibinab@unisa.ac.za 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Motor insurance constitutes the bulk of the business 
that is underwritten by short-term insurance 
companies. It also represents a source of many claims 
for the insurance companies. As such this line of 
business thrives where there is risk diversification 
and hence the law of large numbers is observed. Most 
governments in both the developing and developed 
countries have legislated and provided for 
compulsory motor insurance. The basic form of such 
a policy is that it is will at least cover liability for 
third parties in respect of property damage and bodily 
injury or death.  
According to the South Africa Insurance 
Association (SAIA) (2014), only 35% of the vehicles 
in South Africa are insured. While SAIA does not 
give actual numbers, it is evident that the chances that 
when a person is involved in an accident where more 
than one part is involved, there is a 65% chance that 
the other car is uninsured. Uninsured losses are either 
borne by the insurers or the other party that is 
uninsured. Skogh (1982) alludes to the tendency by 
human beings not to buy insurance where the chances 
of a loss are low but the size of the loss will be very 
significant. The 65% uninsured household seems to 
confirm this behaviour. Cohen and Dehejiah (2004) 
found that indeed compulsory insurance does achieve 
its intended goals. These goals are namely; the 
reduction of uninsured losses and provision of 
compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents. 
Whilst they revealed that a no fault system was 
associated with an increase in road accident fatalities, 
in South Africa the statistics show an increase in road 
fatalities without a compulsory insurance in place. In 
2001 the fatal crashes that were experienced were 
11201 and in 2010 they stood at 13 967 representing 
a 24.69% increase in road fatalities. As early as 1919, 
Carman had shown that the non-existence of 
compulsory motor third party insurance prejudiced 
the road users who could not recover or could not 
afford the legal costs for attorneys.  
Birmingham and Brannan (2012) explain the 
concept of subrogation, which is the basis for insurers 
to claim form third parties who cause losses. 
Subrogation is defined generally as the substitution of 
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one thing for another, or of one person into the place 
of another with respect to rights, claims, or securities 
(King 1951). Kimball and Davis (1962) stress on the 
two basis for subrogation namely; the non-extension 
of benefits to third party who is not privy to the 
contract and the concept of indemnity whereby the 
insured must not lose or benefit from insurance. 
Rather the insured must be put back to the same 
financial position that they were prior to the loss. 
Further, subrogation assists the insured and the 
insurer to maintain a good loss ratio and thus will 
improve business performance of the insurers and the 
insurance industry respectively. In addition 
compulsory motor insurance is believed to improve 
the level of care by drivers. With such alarming rates 
of uninsured vehicles, the right of insurers to recover 
is taken away or diminished. It is therefore imperative 
that a solution is sought that would address the issue 
of increasing road fatalities as well as the very high 
levels of uninsured losses. 
South Africa had compulsory motor insurance 
from 1942 to 1997 which covered property damage 
and bodily injury or death. This was replaced by the 
Road Accident Fund (RAF) which covers bodily 
injury or death of third parties only. However the 
cover provided by RAF has proven to be grossly 
inadequate and hence an alternative funding 
arrangement has become a policy imperative now 
more than ever before. In this article we seek to 
reveal the need to move towards compulsory third 
party motor insurance. It is our contention that a 
move towards compulsory motor insurance will not 
only benefit insurers but it will also assist consumers 
as well.  
The remainder of paper is arranged as follows: 
the next section reviews the theoretical framework 
underpinning compulsory third party motor 
insurance. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature. 
Section 4 describes the research methodology and 
presents the empirical results. Section 5 discusses 
economic and policy implications and then Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Motor insurance essentially comes in three covers 
namely; comprehensive insurance, third party fire and 
theft and lastly third party insurance. Under 
comprehensive insurance, the insured is covered for 
accidental damage, fire damage as well as third party 
liability. Comprehensive insurance is an all-
encompassing cover, which will cover perils that 
include accidents, theft, fire, and damage to third 
party properties. Third party fire and theft excludes 
own damage (property damage) and covers the rest of 
the perils that may happen to a motor vehicle. Third 
party liability insurance, which is the focus of this 
article, covers legal liability to third parties who are 
injured or whose property is damaged by an insured. 
This type of cover can be voluntary which means that 
there is law that makes it compulsory. Therefore 
those who use voluntary liability insurance do so out 
of a motivation to manage their personal exposure to 
third parties who may claim from them. Where the 
cover is compulsory, the state stipulates in a piece of 
legislation that all road users must have motor 
liability insurance. In some territories it includes 
cover for both property and bodily injury whereas is 
some territories it is only for bodily injury or death. 
The focus of this paper is on the compulsory motor 
third party liability insurance. 
 
2.1 The Theory of Compulsory Motor 
Insurance 
 
In determining whether one is liable or not at law, 
two approaches a used. These are strict liability or 
negligence based liability. Under strict liability, there 
is no need to prove negligence. If an individual 
causes harm to another then they are reliable to the 
other party. Negligence liability requires proof of 
negligence on the part of the individual that caused 
the loss. Under a strict liability system, it is obvious 
that once an individual injures another, they are 
liable. However with negligence, it is possible that 
the negligence may not be proven.  
In their handbook, Polinsky and Shavell (2007) 
illustrate the implications of the responsibility for 
injuries under two main approaches namely; 
unilateral and bi-lateral accidents. Unilateral 
accidents approach assumes that only the injurers can 
reduce the level of risk by taking care. They show 
that both under strict liability and negligence liability, 
the injurer has an incentive to take optimal care since 
they will seek to reduce their expenditure on their 
duty of care. The following variables are used to 
denote the total expected costs.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = 𝑥 + 𝑝(𝑥)ℎ 
 
Where 𝑥 = expenditure on care 
P(𝑥) = probability of an accident that causes 
harm h 
ℎ = harm 
Assume that 𝑥∗ = Optimal 𝑥 
 
If strict liability is assumed, the injurer will seek 
to minimize the level of total expenses. However 𝑥 is 
always equal to ℎ and thus they seek to minimise 𝑥∗.  
In Skogh (1982) an almost similar model is 
presented which states that the injurer is assumed to 
be the one that is in control and expected to reduce 
the possibility of loss. He mentions a concept of 
costless bargaining where both victims and the 
injurers will sign an unenforceable contract to 
compensate each other. While that approach can 
make sense, it is close to impossible for each motorist 
to enter into such contracts with each and every 
motorist. This then justifies the involvement of an 
external regulator.  
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With negligence liability, the injurer is faced 
with a situation where his level of care is denoted by . 
If the level of care is below the optimal level, the 
injurer will be liable. However if the level of care is 
above the optimal, the injurer will not be liable. Thus 
it can be seen that either way the injurer has an 
incentive to be careful. While Polinsky and Shavell 
(2007) present a bilateral approach that shows the 
optimal level when both the injurer and the victim are 
taking care, they do not explain the factors behind the 
level of care. However according to Li, Liu and Peng 
(2012), the income of consumers and their risk 
aversion do have an impact on their level of care. 
Higher income consumers tend to be risk averse and 
therefore exercise more caution in their driving. The 
high income earners tend to purchase more liability 
insurance since it is unrelated to the value of the cars 
while older and female policyholders also bought 
more liability cover.  
In the bi-lateral approach, they also suggest that 
both the victim and the injurer will seek an optimal 
level of care where they will not be held liable for 
damages. Brown (1973) cited in Polinsky and Shavell 
(2007) also concurs that under both the strict liability 
and negligence liability rules, the injurer and the 
victim will exercise optimal care. It is interesting to 
note that while Polinsky and Shavell (2007) revealed 
that it is possible to reach an optimal level under the 
negligence rule, Skogh (1982) brings another fact 
related to that. The injurer may do just enough to 
avoid negligence without being optimal. O’Connel 
(1978) hailed the introduction of the no fault system 
as the answer to the problems associated with the 
fault system which included high costs per vehicle as 
well as compensating fewer victims. O’Connel and 
Joost 1986 upheld the same benefits of no-fault 
insurance. Li, Liu and Peng (2012) found out that 
when a consumer purchases a bundle of insurance 
with higher damage cover and lower liability cover, 
there was a higher possibility of them putting a 
damage claim. They do not however show the impact 
of liability insurance on accident. They however 
found that in Taiwan a higher damage cover and a 
higher liability cover resulted in lower claims making 
these customers eligible for even lower premium 
rates. Thus higher liability cover reduces the loss 
ratio. Li, Liu and Peng (2012) did not however reveal 
the impact of compulsory insurance on the loss ratio 
since they were considering the use of bundled 
insurance where both damage and liability cover are 
purchased. In Taiwan however the insured will only 
claim under voluntary insurance if the loss exceeds 
the compulsory limit. This might result in 
underestimated claims. On the other hand, Bermudez 
and Karlis (2011) found out that urban driving and 
experience above five years decreased the possibility 
of third party claims. Younger drivers and women 
drivers also increased expected claims in Madrid and 
Catalonia.  
While Polinsky and Shavell (2007) state that 
under strict liability, the level of care are optimally 
controlled, they state that there is no liability rule that 
can induce optimal behaviour. The type of legal 
system used does thus not influence the level of 
responsibility. This view is also upheld in Skogh 
(1982) where it is stated that tort liability cannot 
prevent accidents. Tomeski (2012) shows that 
compulsory motor insurance is one of the most 
important and most sought after product in 
developing countries. As of 2008 European Union 
companies participating in compulsory motor 
insurance had significant gross written premium 
increases with the total liability insurance 
contributing 30% of the premium for all classes in 
Europe.  
Whilst the purchase of damage insurance will 
lead to the purchase of liability insurance, the 
purchase of liability insurance does not lead to the 
purchase of damage insurance ( Li, Liu and Peng , 
2012). Further they contend that uninsured drivers are 
more likely to be injured in a crash. They go on to 
observe that liability insurance reduces the financial 
costs associated with accidents. This may however 
lead to an increase in fatalities. Further to this they 
discovered that the loss ratio where there was higher 
damage cover was lower than where there was a 
higher liability cover. Commenting on how to price 
the liability cover, Tomeski (2012) says that the price 
must be determined based on supply and demand. He 
further suggests that a lower limit price must be set to 
safeguard the solvency of the insurers. Kiyak and 
Pranckeviciute (2014) mention compulsory insurance 
as an important factor when pricing motor insurance. 
Keaton and Kwerel (1984) cited in Jost (1996), 
expose the concept of limited liability for negligent 
drivers as a result of compulsory insurance. Whatever 
loss they will cause will be covered despite the 
circumstances. Essentially this discourages optimal 
behaviour on the policyholders.  
Jost (1996) observes that under compulsory 
motor insurance insurers have no ways of monitoring 
the behaviour of the consumers. The same argument 
was raised by Cohen and Dehejia (2004) when they 
indicated that a no-fault system for compulsory 
insurance will lead to more fatalities on the road since 
the financial consequences of the losses are reduced 
by compulsory insurance. Thus moral hazard is 
increased. They however admit that compulsory 
insurance achieves its intended goal of reducing the 
number of uninsured losses and thus victims get 
compensation. Faure (2006) also highlights the moral 
risk issue. He also argues that if it is not managed 
then third party motor insurance will create more 
problems than solutions. 
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2.2 Alternative Approaches to Managing 
the Motor Liability Risk 
 
Polinsky and Shavell (2007) refer to taxation and 
regulation as alternatives to managing the negative 
activities such as motor liability. They strongly 
uphold the non-involvement of the government in 
liability insurance as it may remove some of the 
incentives that come with conventional insurance. 
Skogh (1982) observes that in most countries there 
was a move towards all-inclusive publicly financed 
programmes. The downside to an all-inclusive 
programmed is also echoed by Skogh (1982). He 
further indicates that the public programmes are 
normally accompanied by measures to reduce 
accidents. While Skogh (2007) points to the 
disadvantages of government involvement in 
compulsory insurance, he alludes to the fact that the 
public agencies can ensure smooth, uniform and 
compensation processes. One of the lacking areas in 
literature is that there has been limited work on 
comparing the use of compulsory insurance and other 
punitive measures such as taxes and fines.  
These alternatives are the ones suggested by 
Skogh (1982). Use of punishments and taxes are the 
alternatives that he brings. A typical tax might be a 
tax on cars, petrol or roads which might reduce 
traffic. The weakness of that approach is that it 
ignores driver behaviour and road conditions. Fines 
on the other hand are more deterrent that the tax 
system due to their stochastic nature. They can be 
differentiated according to the level of negligence. 
Skogh (1982) continues to say that the cost of 
differentiating taxes can be exorbitant. Tomeski 
(2012) similarly argues that the regulation of a price 
by the state is aimed at keeping it at a level affordable 
by many so as to reduce the level of the uninsured 
vehicles. Fair prices are however difficult to establish 
due to lack of reliable data. He further advocates for 
liberalization of insurance markets to ensure efficient 
risk assessment, selection and pricing. Liberalized 
markets he argues will lead to more careful and 
responsible users.  
An important formula is also supplied by 
Tomeski (2012). This formula is for determining the 
risk premium and is given below: 
 
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒖𝒎 =  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
 
One can observe that when the pool gets bigger, 
the statistical accuracy of the rates will improve and 
the risk premium will be lower. However if the risk 
increases, the insurers will have no option but to 
increase the premiums. 
 
 
 
 
2.3 The Advantages of Compulsory Third 
Party Motor Insurance 
 
Several benefits have been cited by various authors. 
Polinsky and Shavell (2007) stated that the use of 
compulsory motor insurance is an incentive for 
optimal care under a negligence liability system. With 
strict liability, the picture is different. The victims 
also take care. Thus both the injurer and the victim 
will exercise optimal care. Skogh (1982) argues that 
under the negligence system, the injurer may do just 
enough but not optimal care to avoid liability. 
According to Li et al (2012), bundling higher liability 
and higher damage cover drove down the claims 
experience and resultantly lowered premiums. 
However they also show that while liability insurance 
reduces financial costs associated with accidents, it 
resulted in increased fatalities. Skogh (1982) echoed 
the same benefit of reduced accidents.  
In EU in 2008, 30% of gross premiums came 
from compulsory motor insurance (Tomeski, 2012). 
Further he confirms that in developing countries, 
compulsory motor insurance is the most sought after 
cover. He goes on to suggest that a competitive 
market rather than a state-run facility. The logic being 
that a competitive market will instil discipline among 
drivers through the pricing system. Bao and Gu 
(2014) add to the list of the benefits of compulsory 
insurance when they stated that the compulsory 
insurance system was aimed at offering timely and 
effective medical treatment to victims. This would 
result in eased financial burdens. Compulsory 
insurance helps protect victims against the insolvency 
of the injurer (Faure, 2006). 
 
3. Empirical Literature Review 
 
In this section we review the motor insuring 
arrangements of both the developed countries and the 
developing countries and end by focusing on the 
status quo in South Africa. 
 
3.1 Motor Insurance in the Developed 
Countries 
 
3.1.1 Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance in 
Turkey 
 
Gonulal (2009) cites several developing countries that 
have compulsory motor insurance and the benefits 
that they have derived. For illustration purposes we 
will discuss Turkey Positive achievements have been 
realized in Turkey as a result of the introduction of 
compulsory motor insurance. “After many years of 
work, Turkey has moved to MTPL insurance in 
which insurance companies, insurance agents, and the 
supervisory authority cooperate. The goal of this new 
order is to reduce the number of fake policies, to 
increase the penetration of insurance, and to enable 
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the agencies to be useful to the system rather than 
harmful”, writes Gonulal (2009).  
The problems cited by Gonulal (2009) which 
Turkey experienced before the introduction of a 
central database are listed as follows: 
 High percentage of uninsured vehicles 
 Incorrect application of the bonus-malus system 
 No uniform claims history 
 Unrecorded policies and fraud (loss of 
premiums) 
 Organized fraud 
 Poor competitive practices including price 
dumping 
 Manual issuance of policies 
 Lack of uniform data 
 Drain on the guarantee fund 
 Loss of tax revenue 
 Bankruptcy of some insurance companies. 
It is confirmed that most of these problems have 
disappeared and the others are on the decline. 
 
3.1.2 Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance in 
Japan 
 
It is compulsory to have motor insurance in Japan. 
The cover is only for death, bodily injury and medical 
expenses. Thus property damage is excluded. In 
addition to this, the cover under the compulsory 
insurance is not too generous. Thus voluntary 
insurance is necessary in protecting against the huge 
liability that might arise not only due to death or 
bodily injury but also form loss of property by third 
parties.  
Compulsory automobile liability is organised as 
a form of social insurance: premiums are subject to a 
gross rate tariff intended to produce a break-even 
underwriting result; all insurers participate in a 
reinsurance pool and most claims are negotiated on 
behalf of the industry by the General Insurance 
Rating Organisation of Japan. 
Voluntary motor premium volumes fell by 5.6% 
between 2000 and 2009. This decline, which is 
expected to be a long-term feature of the market, was 
mainly the result of population ageing, which has 
reduced the proportion of highly rated young drivers 
and increased the average level of no claim bonus. 
There has been a reversal of this trend since 2010, 
however, partly because of an increase in new car 
purchases and partly because of increasing premium 
rates, particularly for accident-prone elderly drivers. 
Rate increases still tend to lag behind losses, 
however, with the result that the combined operating 
ratio has been above 100% every year since 2007. A 
new no claim bonus system reduced claim frequency 
in 2013, though the effect of this may be negated by 
planned increases in consumption tax in 2014-15 
which will increase repair and distribution costs. The 
mandatory cover is known as compulsory automobile 
liability insurance (CALI) and only applies to third 
party bodily injury. The Automobile Liability Security 
Law specifies the maximum limits of insurers' 
liability in respect of death, each of 14 specified 
grades of permanent disability and other injury. The 
current limits, which apply to each and every accident 
and claimant, were last revised on 1 April 2002 and 
are currently as follows: 
 
Table 1. The insurers’maximum limits of liability for motor accidents 
 
Injury Limit (JPY mn) 
Death 30.00 
First grade permanent disability requiring constant nursing care 40.00 
First grade permanent disability other than the above 30.00 
Second grade permanent disability requiring intermittent nursing care 30.00 
Second grade permanent disability other than the above 25.90 
14th grade permanent disability 0.75 
Other bodily injury 1.20 
 
Source: Axco Global Statistics / Industry Associations and Regulatory Bodies 
 
Voluntary motor policies provide a wide range 
of optional covers including own vehicle damage 
(excluding earthquake), theft, third party bodily 
injury in excess of the CALI limits, third party 
property damage, self-incurred personal accident, 
uninsured motorists, passengers' personal accident, 
personal injury protection, legal expenses etc. 
Victims of uninsured or untraced drivers are entitled 
to receive compensation from a government 
compensation plan which is funded by a levy on 
CALI premiums. 
 
 
3.1.3 Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance in 
America 
 
All states except New Hampshire have a compulsory 
insurance system. The cover under these systems 
includes death, bodily injury, medical expenses and 
damage to property. The cover appears to vary form one 
state to the other. What stands out in America is that the 
existence of compulsory insurance has not removed the 
problem of uninsured cars. In addition there are 
problems that arise when a vehicle comes from a state 
where the cover is not compulsory and causes harm to a 
car form a regulated state. Despite having compulsory 
insurance, uninsured losses still happen. In a research by 
the National Association of Independent Insurers (now 
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known as PCI), it was found that compulsory insurance 
was not the most effective way of reducing the problem 
of uninsured motor vehicles. States with compulsory 
insurance were found to have higher rates of uninsured 
vehicles when compared to New Hampshire, which has 
no compulsory insurance.  
While affordability has been cited as an important 
determinant of whether one will buy insurance or not, 
there were contradicting facts in some states where the 
premiums were believed to be lowest. While the states 
are not discarding compulsory insurance, they are 
including extra measures to complement the system. 
Among these measures are registration of foreign 
drivers, no-pay no-play approaches, establishment of 
unsatisfied judgments funds, creation of databases and 
electronic checks. All these seek to close the gaps that 
remain unclosed albeit the presence of compulsory 
insurance. 
 
3.2 Motor Insurance in the Developing 
Countries 
 
3.3.1 Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance in 
Nigeria 
 
In Nigeria Section 65 of the Insurance Act 2003 
regulates compulsory insurance. Under this Act, there is 
provision for compensation to third parties who suffer 
bodily injury. A safety net called Motor Accident 
Victims Insurance Compensation Scheme (MAVICS). 
This facility enables compensation to third parties 
injured by uninsured cars or unidentified vehicles. This 
is unlike the Road Accident Fund in South Africa which 
caters for all bodily injury that is suffered on the roads 
despite the car being identified or not. The World Bank 
(2013) records that the MAVICS has improved the third 
party liability cover in Nigeria. This report highlights the 
importance of consumer protection with regard to the 
cost of intermediation. Further it states that compulsory 
insurance enforcement is suboptimal despite the active 
efforts by government to grow the insurance sector.  
 
3.2.2 Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance in 
Brazil 
 
Compulsory insurance has been in existence in Brazil 
since 1974. The cover is linked to licensing in that one 
obtains it at the same time when one is renewing their 
motor license. It is a condition for licensing. Thus it is 
unavoidable. The events covered by the compulsory 
insurance in Brazil closely mirrors the ones covered by 
the Road Accident Fund in South Africa. It covers death, 
permanent disability and medical plus supplementary 
expenses. Whereas in South Africa the premiums are 
paid in the form of a fuel tax, in Brazil it is paid for 
together with the licensing fees. Both ways ensure 
minimal evasion by road users. It must be noted that the 
Brazilian system pays whether the driver was at fault or 
not. There is no need to prove fault. Thus all accidents 
are covered. This ensures faster settlement of claims and 
reduces administration work. As discussed earlier on, 
this system in believed to have its advantages such as 
both parties taking care are experienced. However 
according to Gonulal (2009), these advantages are lost 
since either way there will be compensation. On the 
other hand, the downside of a negligence system where 
the driver may do just enough to avoid accidents are 
reduced.  
 
3.2.3 Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance in 
Zambia 
 
Zambia has a unique type of arrangement where private 
insurance companies provide the compulsory insurance, 
which is a requirement of the Road Traffic Act. Whereas 
in other countries it only provides only for death, 
permanent disability and medical expenses, in Zambia 
property damage is also incorporated. In addition to this 
whereas in the conventional third party insurance, the 
insured’s family and insured are excluded, in the 
Zambian case they are included in the cover. Upon 
entering Zambia foreign vehicles are required to 
purchase compulsory insurance at the border. When this 
cover was introduced in Zambia, it was viewed as a 
form of a tax and drivers viewed it negatively. However 
it must be noted that while that may look like the case, 
motor insurance does not only ease the burden that the 
government has towards victims, it also eases the 
personal liability that individuals would carry.  
 
3.3 Compulsory Motor Insurance in South 
Africa 
 
Prior to 1997 compulsory insurance was governed by 
the following legislation: Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 
1942 (Act No. 29 of 1942, Compulsory Motor Vehicle 
Insurance Act, 1972 (Act No. 56 of 1972), Motor 
Vehicle Accident Act, 1986 (Act No. 84 of 1986); and 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act, 1989 
(Act No. 93 of 1989). While the reasons for 
discontinuing with compulsory motor insurance are not 
publicly available, it appears that affordability by the 
public was one of the issues. On 1 May 1997 South 
Africa introduced the Road Accident Fund (RAF). In the 
following section we summarise the operation and 
limitations of this fund. 
 
3.3.1 The Road Accident Fund 
 
The RAF is responsible for providing compulsory social 
insurance cover to all users of South African roads; to 
rehabilitate and compensate persons injured as a result 
of the negligent driving of motor; and to actively 
promote the safe use of all South African roads. Section 
3 of the RAF Act stipulates that "the object of the Fund 
shall be the payment of compensation in accordance 
with this Act for loss or damage wrongfully caused by 
the driving of a motor vehicle". The fund only caters for 
bodily injury or death to third parties as a result of 
driving the vehicle. Property damage falls outside the 
scope of this fund. Where the offender does not have 
motor insurance, the victim may have no recourse if the 
injurer has no financial capacity to meet the damages. It 
is noteworthy that where the definition of driving is not 
met by the circumstances, the fund will not respond. 
Further, this fund excludes cover where the wrongdoer 
is not legally liable for the injury. If the wrongdoer is 
not legally liable RAF is also not liable. In addition the 
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fund has statutory exclusions. These relate to cover 
under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act (COIDA). Military vehicles are also not 
included.  
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
In this article we make use of descriptive statistics to 
investigate the developments in the motor vehicle 
population and motor vehicle crashes in South Africa. 
 
4.1. An overview of key metrics in Motor 
Insurance in South Africa 
 
The number of registered vehicles in South Africa has 
grown in leaps and bounds over the years from roughly 
three million in 1980 to roughly nine million in 2009. 
The trends are depicted in Table 2 and Figure 1a. The 
highest growth rate in the population of registered 
vehicles coincided with the dawn of independence in 
1994. The number of registered vehicles grew from 490 
million vehicles in 1993 to roughly 530 million vehicles 
in 1994. In percentage terms the growth rate was 
roughly nine per cent (Refer to Figure 1b). This is 
explicable in terms of that the majority of financial 
liberalization and hence more and more blacks became 
eligible for credit to finance the purchases of motor cars. 
The growth rate in registered motor vehicles also took a 
knocking during the period corresponding with the 
financial crises (2007-2009). It declined from a high of 
roughly seven per cent recorded in 2006 to a low of 
roughly three per cent in 2008. 
The number of unroadworthy vehicles that are 
licenced increased from roughly 170 thousand in 2001 
to roughly 410 thousand in 2010. The highest increase in 
the number of unroadworthy vehicles was recorded 
between 2005 and 2009. In 2005 there were nearly 195 
thousand unroadworthy motor vehicles on South African 
roads, yet the number shot up to nearly 430 thousand 
motor vehicles in 2009 (Refer to Table 3 and Figure 2 ) 
The number of fatal crashes increased from 
roughly 12 thousand in 2001 to a highest of roughly 16 
thousand in 2006. The number of fatalities increased 
from around 11 thousand in 2001 to roughly 16 
thousand in 2006 (Refer to Figure 3). The rand cost of 
fatal accidents to the South African economy rose from 
roughly eight billion rands in 2002 to roughly 14 billion 
rands in 2010 (See Figure 4). 
The number of road accidents increased from 
around 320 thousand in 1980 to a highest of roughly 520 
thousand in 1996 (See Table 4 below). The incidence of 
road traffic accidents has tapered off to an average of 
eight per cent from a high of roughly 11 per cent in 
1981. This remains high (Refer to Figure 5). 
 
Table 2. The number of registered motor vehicles in South Africa 
 
YEAR NUMBER OF REGISTERED VEHICLES PERCENTAGE INCREASE % 
1980 3102437 1,1 
1981 3319453 7,0 
1982 3600559 8,5 
1983 3732021 3,7 
1984 3968228 6,3 
1985 4056558 2,2 
1986 4228523 4,2 
1987 4285333 1,3 
1988 4317082 0,7 
1989 4511088 4,5 
1990 4667794 3,5 
1991 4752564 1,8 
1992 4811587 1,2 
1993 4870609 1,2 
1994 5314411 9,1 
1995 5750147 8,2 
1996 5793038 0,7 
1997 5832525 0,7 
1998 5902758 1,2 
1999 5992057 1,5 
2000 6074201 1,4 
2001 6159679 1,4 
2002 6245392 1,4 
2003 6417484 2,8 
2004 6677239 4,0 
2005 7128791 6,8 
2006 7653044 7,4 
2007 8133723 6,3 
2008 8357564 2,8 
2009 8600031 2,9 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
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Figure 1a. The number of registered vehicles in South Africa 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
 
Figure 1b. The annual percentage change in the number of registered vehicles in South Africa 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
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Table 3. Key metrics in measuring trends in motor accidents 
 
Year Number Of 
Unroadworthy Vehicles 
Number Of 
Fatal Crashes 
Number Of 
Fatalities 
Estimated Cost Of Fatal Crashes / Zar 
2001 170462 11514 11201 9 581 917 744 
2002 171625 10239 12354 8 020 240 000 
2003 172833 10471 12635 8 893 730 000 
2004 197924 11614 14125 9 985 970 000 
2005 194926 14908 14135 10 032 800 000 
2006 255099 16474 15419 12 950 000 000 
2007 369291 15612 14920 13 112 000 000 
2008 377105 14169 13769 12 687 110 000 
2009 428714 10857 13768 13 385 580 000 
2010 408815 10837 13967 13 579 052 576 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
 
Figure 2. The number of unroadworthy but licensed vehicles in South Africa  
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports)  
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Figure 3. The number of fatal crashes and fatalities (deaths) recorded in South Africa 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
 
Figure 4. The Rand cost of fatal crashes in South Africa 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports)  
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Table 4. The incidence of motor vehicle crashes in South Africa 
 
Year Number Of Registered Vehicles Number Of Road Traffic Crashes Incidence Of Crashes/ % 
1980 3 102 437 319507 10,3 
1981 3 319 453 379852 11,4 
1982 3 600 560 392971 10,9 
1983 3 732 021 388599 10,4 
1984 3 968 228 412097 10,4 
1985 4 056 558 369185 9,1 
1986 4 228 523 372667 8,8 
1987 4 285 333 387148 9,0 
1988 4 317 082 418483 9,7 
1989 4 511 088 434935 9,6 
1990 4 616 398 433287 9,4 
1991 4 727 007 444541 9,4 
1992 4 786 079 429485 9,0 
1993 4 845 151 434029 9,0 
1994 4 904 223 467997 9,5 
1995 5 733 497 500233 8,7 
1996 5 776 424 520774 9,0 
1997 5 819 351 505988 8,7 
1998 5 850 566 511605 8,7 
1999 5 992 057 452915 7,6 
2000 6 074 201 498222 8,2 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
 
Figure 5. The incidence of motor vehicle crashes in South Africa 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ own compilation, data from RTMC (various reports) 
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5. Economic and Policy Implications 
 
The cost of motor vehicle accidents remains very 
high in South Africa. We have shown that the cost of 
fatal motor vehicle crashes averages 14 billion rands 
to the economy. Further the incidence of motor 
vehicle crashes averages eight per cent in recent 
years. From a macroeconomic perspective, the cost of 
motor vehicle accidents could be mutilating economic 
growth. Rather than invest in productive areas of the 
economy, the South African government is brought 
upon to bear the economic costs of motor vehicle 
accidents as it currently subsides the Road Accident 
Fund. 
We have already alluded to the inefficacy of the 
Road Accident Fund in that it is only limited to motor 
third party liability for bodily injury and death and 
excludes property damage of third parties. We thus 
wish to proffer policy advice, namely that, the South 
African government needs to promulgate laws that 
make motor third party policies mandatory. The 
benefits of such an arrangement will be very immense 
to the economy. Firstly such an arrangement will 
drive down the price of motor insurance due to 
economies of scale experienced and hence unlock the 
value of motor insurance to the short-term insurance 
industry. This will ensure that this line of business 
becomes profitable to the short-term insurers as well. 
Secondly such funds (premiums) will be invested in 
the productive sectors of the economy and hence 
stimulate economic activity. This will ensure that the 
short-term insurance industry plays a critical role in 
intermediation, savings and resource mobilisation 
(Sibindi and Godi, 2014). 
There are two policy options that we would like 
to proffer. The first option is that the government 
maintains the Road Accident Fund which in its 
current format only covers third party liability for 
bodily injury and death. It will then have to legislate 
for compulsory third party motor insurance in respect 
of third party property damage, which is the cover for 
the actual damage of third party motor vehicles or 
their property occasioned by motor accidents. The 
alternative policy proposition is that the government 
dissolves the Road Accident Fund and promulgates 
laws that make full motor third party insurance 
mandatory. In this variant of motor third party 
insurance, the insurance policy will respond for both 
property damage as well as liability for bodily injury 
and death of third parties. However we are inclined to 
recommend the first option as it will be easier to 
operationalize and will not result in any job losses. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this article we sought to demonstrate the impelling 
need to reintroduce motor third party insurance in 
South Africa. We have demonstrated that the cost of 
accidents to the fiscus remain relatively high at 
around 14 billion rands in 2010. Moreover the 
number of insured vehicles remains very low, at a 
paltry figure of roughly 35 per cent. This has pushed 
up the price of motor insurance. As such it is 
imperative for the South African government to 
reintroduce mandatory third party insurance to 
alleviate these challenges. Indeed compulsory third 
party insurance is the panacea for the short-term 
insurance industry as it will broaden the premium 
base and hence improve the performance of the motor 
book of business. 
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